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ABSTRACT 
 This research addresses cyber threats to smart energy grids. This research 
identified and characterized threats to electric-power grids by analysis of traffic in a 
simulated grid. We deployed a high-interaction honeypot that simulates a grid named 
GridPot. Network-traffic captures and honeypot-activity logs were analyzed to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our honeypot at collecting intelligence for threat 
analysis. This study will contribute to the efforts of the Department of Defense and 
Department of Homeland Security to protect U.S. critical infrastructure from cyber 
threats. 
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In support of the National Security Strategy, this work addresses the defenses of 
cyber-physical systems and critical infrastructure pertaining to bulk electric systems. It 
examines cyber threats to smart energy grids and aims to identify and characterize threats 
as learned through data analysis of traffic within a simulated grid. This threat survey aims 
to build awareness of potential vulnerabilities, thereby reducing the risk to actual critical 
systems. Identification and characterization of threats applicable to energy resilience 
contribute to the risk management of critical infrastructure as directed in SECNAVINST 
3501.1D [1]. 
A. MOTIVATION 
For most of the twentieth century, security for a critical-infrastructure operation 
such as the bulk power system meant only physical security. Securing of that infrastructure 
was achieved with a fence around dangerous or critical equipment such as regulators and 
transformers. Later in the twentieth century, locks and barbed wire were added to increase 
security in light of more direct threats of domestic terrorism. Current security postures have 
expanded to include a cybersecurity architecture for risk management and assessment [2]. 
In the early days of cyber-physical system development, insufficient resources were 
spent mitigating risks to industrial systems [3]. Added risk can be seen in the loss of 
expertise in the actual operation of the power equipment. A switch or transformer that was 
once operated manually by an experienced operator may now be operated by an individual 
who has not physically visited the site or has a limited understanding of the safe operation 
of the power-system equipment. Alternatively, an experienced operator is now interacting 
with a computer system instead of the physical equipment and must learn how to correctly 
operate the computer equipment along with the power system. An increasing risk is that 
the cyber-physical system could be controlled by an unauthorized operator. Before the 
advent of cyber-physical systems, to control an industrial system an unauthorized operator 
had to gain physical access to the system. Now any device connected to the Internet risks 
unauthorized access. 
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There is an elevated risk to network-connected critical infrastructure, over other 
information technology systems, due to the potential catastrophic impact if it were to fail. 
Cyber security of critical infrastructure systems cannot be limited to traditional 
information-technology defense measures, and defense in depth must be applied. An 
industrial-control systems honeypot can be deployed as an extra layer for defense in depth, 
for either all the system or a single high-value component. Hackers could be fooled into 
thinking a honeypot is the real system. Adversarial targets, objectives, or techniques could 
be learned by capturing the traffic patterns or noting system changes within the honeypot. 
Not only would this be valuable intelligence to ensure our limited time and resources are 
being applied against the most targeted systems, but honeypots waste attacker time. 
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) 
reports approximately 1.3 million reports of indications of compromise (IOCs) related to 
cyber and communications since March 2016 [4]. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have 
been targeted by four families of malware; the most recent of which is 
CRASHOVERRIDE, aka Industroyer [5]. Stuxnet, BlackEnergy 2, and Havex were earlier 
tailored malware [6]. CRASHOVERRIDE used methods from these three previous 
malwares, creating a new framework designed specifically to attack electric grids [6]. In 
December 2016, a transmission-level substation was attacked in the Ukraine using 
CRASHOVERRIDE [6]. CRASHOVERRIDE exploits network-communications and 
grid-operations knowledge not specific to any configuration or vendor, and with minimal 
tailoring can be repurposed to affect grid operations in North America, Europe, and 
portions of Asia, and the Middle East [6]. Further proof that grid operations can be affected 
by a cyberattack was demonstrated in a U.S. Department of Energy test at Idaho Labs in 
2007 known as the Aurora Experiment, which caused the self-destruction of a replica 
power plant generator by means of a cyberattack [7]. 
Sridhar et al. [8] identified cyber threats that target the distribution portion of the 
bulk power system as load shedding, advanced metering infrastructures, and demand-side 
management. The United States has seen load-shedding incidents in recent years that have 
caused cascading power outages affecting tens of thousands if not millions of customers. 
In 2007, Tempe, Arizona experienced large-scale load shedding which affected 98,700 
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customers for almost an hour [8]. In 2003, the North America experienced its most severe 
blackout on record [9]. 
B. RESEARCH PLAN 
Our research constructed a honeypot, a device with only the purpose of collecting 
information about those that interact with the honeypot [10]. This research implemented a 
high-interaction honeypot simulating a smart energy grid. We used a high interaction 
honeypot to draw in more advanced attackers. We used GridPot, an open-source symbolic 
cyber-physical honeynet framework, to emulate realistic protocols common to industrial-
control systems [11]. The primary module we studied was Powerflow created by GridLAB-
D, which models an electrical distribution system [12]. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides background information about honeypots and previous work 
involving honeypots. Chapter III addresses the North American Bulk Power System, 
industrial-control systems (ICS), GridPot’s architecture, five common ICS network 
protocols, and similar work. Chapter IV outlines our research methodology, with host-
environment details, GridPot modifications, data collection phases, and design of parsers 
for data analysis. Chapter V discusses the results of our collection and data analysis. 
Chapter VI contains our conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. HONEYPOTS 
A honeypot is a network node with no purpose other than to detect and analyze 
unauthorized activity directed at computers and digital devices [13]. Honeypots can 
provide data and information about an intrusion afterwards to simplify its future detection 
or provide information about an attacker [10]. Honeypots can be classified based on their 
reactivity of low, medium, and high. Honeypots are a safe way, with limited risk to a 
systems infrastructure, to capture, analyze, and characterize threats against an information 
system. 
Honeypots have two general uses as either a tool for research or production [14]. 
Research honeypots collect data to be analyzed by a researcher instead of notifying an 
administrator. Production honeypots work with other security measures, like an intrusion 
detection system (IDS), to provide defense-in-depth of networks. An intrusion-detection 
system uses known signatures and threat characteristics to alert administrators of 
unauthorized users or tools on a network. A honeypot could be employed in conjunction 
with such a system to detect activity for which the system has no signature. 
The usefulness of honeypots is related to how much data they collect. Honeypots 
can use deception to entice attackers into revealing a richer set of information about their 
attacks [15]. Honeypots that conceal their purpose through deception are more productive 
because attackers do not want to interact with honeypots [15]. High-interaction honeypots 
can confuse attackers through program-based or scripted interaction designed to encourage 
further exploration. The longer an attacker interacts with a honeypot, the more complete 
the data set will be. 
B. PREVIOUS WORK 
1. The Honeynet Project 
A honeynet is a network of honeypots to simulate production networks without 
actually producing anything. The Honeynet Project worked to discover using honeynets 
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the tools and tactics of potential attackers, to improve cyber-security methods [16]. How 
an organization might integrate a honeynet into an existing production network is depicted 
in Figure 1. A sensor captures key information from attempted accessing of the honeynet 
from the Internet. A honeynet deployed in this manner could collect information from 
attackers outside of the organization as well as insider threats. 
 
Figure 1.  A Honeynet. Source: [16]. 
To collect data from attackers, one could focus on logging key strokes of attackers 
[16]. However, keystrokes do not capture the activity of a script that the attacker might 
deploy. Focusing on any one layer of the TCP/IP stack with focused tools has weaknesses 
since no single layer tells a complete picture. Instead, several collection points are 
necessary to understand motives and effects of attackers as with packets, log flows, and 
log keystrokes. 
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2. Honeypot-Aware Botnets 
A botnet is a collection of compromised computers controlled by a single site 
(Figure 2). A botnet might be used to send spam, mine cryptocurrencies, or promote 
accounts on social media. 
 
Figure 2.  A Botnet Layout. Source: [17]. 
Botnets have evolved to become aware of honeypots by detecting firewalls and 
filters on outbound traffic [17]. Honeypots desire to limit their liability in case they are 
used to launch an attack on a third party. This could be done with an intrusion-detection 
system that filters for outbound activity. However, a bot controller can detect if a bot is 
prevented from sending malicious data (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Botnet Detection of a Honeypot. Source: [17]. 
3. Privacy Concerns 
Despite the benefits in deploying a honeypot to gather information about a potential 
vulnerability or threat to a network, there are some risks as well. Some researchers would 
argue a honeypot that collects IP addresses, timestamps, and protocol data could be 
considered a personal-data collection system [18]. This article states there is a privacy 
concern when collecting network data, since IP addresses have been used to link criminal 
behavior to individuals. The article mentions the existence of potential privacy concerns in 
the deployment of honeypots and honeynets and in their ability to share threat data with 
peers and partners. Finally, this article mentions publishing information collected from a 
honeypot could provide attackers with information to launch an improved attack. 
4. Cloud-Based Industrial Honeypot 
A cloud-based industrial honeypot project deployed a large-scale low-interaction 
honeypot system for 28 days using Amazon’s EC2 cloud environment [19]. This 
experiment monitored the protocols DNP3, ICCP, IEC-104, MODBUS, SNMP, TFTP, and 
XMPP. This experiment also categorized interaction as either related to Shodan (or 
Shodan’s subdomain) or not. The researchers concluded that reconnaissance activities 
occurred more often than actual attacks and this reconnaissance targeted individual 
 9 
industrial protocols rather than combinations of different protocols. Counts by protocol are 
shown in Figure 4. Additionally, the researchers identified a positive correlation between 
MODBUS reconnaissance activity by non-Shodan sources following Shodan discovery of 
MODBUS-enabled devices. 
 
Figure 4.  Results from Cloud-Based Industrial Honeypot Deployment. 
Source: [19]. 
5. HoneyPhy 
HoneyPhy, a cyber-physical system honeypot framework, was developed to better 
understand attacks against cyber-physical systems [20]. It addressed the problem that 
existing frameworks could be unrealistic in modeling device physics and device-actuation 
times and therefore could be easily identifiable as a honeypot. The authors designed two 
proof-of-concept systems aimed at presenting convincing honeypots. The initial version 
provided general structure-modeling processes and devices implementing a simple 
heating-ventilation system. The extended version provided deployment and log-collection 
specifications for a simple water-treatment system. The authors claimed both versions 
appeared to work well [20]. 
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We used GridPot as the base for our experiments. It is the only open-source high-
interaction industrial-control system honeypot available at the time of this writing. 
A. BULK POWER SYSTEM 
Within the utilities industry, the term ‘electric grid’ refers to the high-voltage 
transmission lines which crisscross the area of transmission of a bulk power system, 
connecting generation sources to local distribution sub-stations [21]. The bulk power 
system of the United States is owned and operated by dozens of individual corporations, 
municipalities, and cooperatives. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for policies 
concerning power generation and transmission in the United States, among other things. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent regulating agency, 
is responsible for the safety, security, and availability of the whole of the U.S. bulk power 
system. FERC has appointed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
as its agent to develop and monitor standards for reliability and safety. NERC provides 
guidance to the regional authorities responsible for geographic zones depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  North American Bulk Power System Interconnections. 
Source: [22]. 
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A bulk power system is divided into four sectors: generation, transmission, 
distribution, and end-use. The generation of electricity occurs in coal-fired plants, natural-
gas plants, solar farms, wind turbines, and hydroelectric plants. Generated electricity is 
passed through transformers to step up voltage to a very high level where it is then 
transferred to transmission lines [21]. Transmission lines deliver electricity to substations. 
Substations use a transformer to step down the voltage from high to low voltage before it 
is distributed to end users. The process of power flow from generation to customer is 
depicted in Figure 6. 
Key components of substations include transformers and switches [23]. 
Transformers change voltage when passing current from one circuit to the next. A switch 
is a device used to direct the flow of current by opening and closing a circuit. A substation 
employs each of these devices to safely control the transfer of current from transmission to 
distribution. We also used regulators in our model. Regulators ensure a constant and safe 
voltage level is maintained throughout the bulk power system. 
 
Figure 6.  Basic Structure of the Electric System. Source: [9]. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, technological advances were made that 
allowed grid operators to monitor and control portions of the electric grid without being at 
each physical location. Industrial control systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, cyber-physical systems (CPS), and Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IEDs) were part of a larger movement of industrial automation. Industrial-control 
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systems provide the ability to control multiple physical devices through connected 
communications. SCADA devices, a subset of industrial-control systems, allow operators 
to monitor many devices over a wide area. Cyber-physical systems integrate physics and 
logic to allow interaction between digital, analog, physical, and human components [24]. 
An IED, like a controller or a digital relay, is a device capable of sending or receiving data 
or control to or from an external source or a combination thereof [3]. 
U.S. Navy ships and shore facilities depend on critical infrastructure that includes 
industrial-control systems. Shipboard cyber-physical systems include mechanical and 
electrical-control systems used to generate power for driving the ship. Critical power-
supply systems and components necessary for operations are found on many military bases, 
including naval facilities. All are vulnerable to the same threats as a shore-based industrial-
control system. 
Internet-connected devices including industrial-control systems, can be found using 
Shodan, an Internet-connected device-search engine. Released in 2009, Shodan provides a 
suite of services used by researchers and technical professionals [54]. Tools offered on 
Shodan’s subscription site include location mapping of connected devices and searching 
using protocol headers to fingerprint devices. Shodan's tool “Honeypot Or Not” returns a 
report indicating if a device at a particular IP address is a honeypot or another type of 
connected device [26]. 
B. GRIDPOT ARCHITECTURE 
1. Conpot 
Conpot is a low-interaction industrial-control-system honeypot associated with the 
Honeynet Project, an international organization dedicated to security research [27], [28]. 
Conpot was developed in 2014 to provide researchers with attack data on supervisory 
control and data acquisition by simulating a Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 programmable 
logic controller (PLC) with common industrial-control-system protocols [29]. Conpot was 
written in Python 2.7 and later upgraded to Python 3. Conpot is connected to the Internet 
and listens on common ports used by industrial-control system devices; it records data from 
other computers and devices that attempt to connect to those ports over the Internet. The 
 14 
data is recoded in a log for a researcher to analyze. The latest version of Conpot, version 
0.6.0, runs nine protocol-related servers with the default template [30]. These protocol-
related servers are MODBUS, S7Comm, HTTP, SNMP, BACNET, IPMI, ENIP, FTP, and 
TFTP. Our honeypot uses Conpot version 0.4.0, enabling MODBUS, S7Comm, HTTP, 
and SNMP servers on startup. 
2. GridLAB-D 
GridLAB-D is a simulation and analysis tool for power-distribution systems [31]. 
It was developed by the Department of Energy and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
to offer users algorithms to model and test distribution systems at a low cost. We used the 
Powerflow module to simulate voltage and current values across an IEEE 13 node grid 
model with 15 houses [32]. The Powerflow module is written using GridLAB-D model 
and Extensible Markup Language (XML) syntax and contains Powerflow objects and 
schedules [33]. GridLAB-D model syntax is similar to C++ though it is not a procedural 
language [34]; objects are described in terms of properties and parameters. Schedules use 
local time to change values in a predefined manner [35]. 
GridLAB-D model objects that were important to our honeypot were node, link, 
switch, transformer, and regulator. Object node properties include ‘phases’, which is used 
to represent a three-phase connection in terms of ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, as well as, ‘N’ for 
neutral phase. Object link properties include the following: ‘from’ and ‘to’ for referencing 
node object connections; ‘status’ used in terms of open or closed; and ‘power-in’ and 
‘power_out’ to express power flow in volt-amperes. The switch, transformer, and regulator 
objects all include properties inherited from the node and link objects. Inherited object 
switch properties include ‘status’, ‘phases’, ‘from’, ‘to’, ‘power_in’, and ‘power_out’. 
Inherited object transformer properties include ‘status’, ‘phases’, ‘from’, and ‘to’, and 
contain three additional properties: ‘ambient_temperature’ to express the temperature 
around the transformer, ‘winding_hot_spot_temparture’ to express the temperature of the 
transformer windings, and ‘configuration’ to describe the specific transformer 
implementation. Inherited object regulator properties include ‘status’, ‘phases’, ‘from’, and 
‘to’, with four additional properties: ‘tap_A’, ‘tap_B’, and ‘tap_C’ to express the position 
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of the tap, and ‘configuration’ to describe the specific regulator implementation. GridLAB-
D model objects that load or transform values can include schedules as parameters to 
change values over time. GridLAB-D model schedules are defined in <minutes hours days 
months weekdays value> form. 
3. GridPot 
GridPot is an open-source honeypot framework for modeling electric grids [36]. 
GridPot uses a honeypot layer and a modeling layer to add electrical components and 
integration between GridLAB-D and Conpot, including IEC 61850 communication [36]. 
GridPot’s honeypot layer is derived from Conpot, adding an XML-formatted GridPot 
template that specifies to which GridLAB-D model (GLM) to link. Additional Python-
coded GridPot files are included in the honeypot layer to retrieve parameter values from 
the running model in real-time using TCP port 6267. GridPot’s primary modeling layer 
uses GridLAB-D’s Powerflow module. GridPot model (GPM) configuration files were 
added to the modeling layer. A GPM configuration file names objects specific to a GLM 
and is referenced by the GridPot template, thus linking the two layers together. A visual of 
the linkages between GridPot’s honeypot and modeling layers is shown in Figure 7. We 
obtained the GridPot source code at https://github.com/sk4ld/gridpot [36]. Our GridPot 
configuration will be discussed more in Chapter IV. 
GridPot source code includes additional modeling features for intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs) under an electric-components subdirectory [36]. This subdirectory contains 
code written in C and XML syntax to simulate a GE Brick Merging Unit and a generic 
input/output (I/O) switch control device. GridPot demo commands state to “start 
configured IEDs,” which implies to start the GE Brick Merging Unit and the switch control 
device [36]. Our honeypot does not utilize the GE Brick device and we left this additional 
modeling piece for future work. 
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Figure 7.  GridPot Architecture 
C. NETWORK PROTOCOLS 
1. HTTP 
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-layer protocol used to 
exchange messages between two programs, a client and a server. The World-Wide Web 
uses HTTP to send request and response messages across the Internet, most often using 
transmission control protocol (TCP) port 80 [37]. Clients can make requests of the server 
via pre-defined methods, such as GET, POST, OPTIONS, HEAD, and TRACE. The GET 
method retrieves the requested specified information. The POST method requests the 
identified resource accepts the enclosed entity and is designed to add, append, or make 
comments to resources. The OPTIONS method requests information (i.e., server 
capabilities) about a specific resource. The HEAD method requests a return of meta-
information (header fields) of the requested entity and is identical to GET except without 
the message-body. The TRACE method is used by a client to gain diagnostic information 
by requesting a reflection of what the server receives in the response body of the message. 
Status codes are sent by the server in response to client method requests. 
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2. MODBUS 
MODBUS is an industrial-control-system application-layer protocol for 
client/server communication shown in Figure 8.  MODBUS was introduced in 1979 and is 
the most common industrial-control-system protocol currently [38]. It is used to remotely 
start operations by devices including programmable logic controllers (PLC), control 
panels, and input/output (I/O) devices. [39]. 
 
Figure 8.  MODBUS Communication of Serial Line (left) and Ethernet Using 
TCP/IP (right). Source: [38]. 
Four MODBUS message types are sent between client and servers on an Ethernet 
TCP/IP network: MODBUS Request, MODBUS Confirmation, MODBUS Indication, and 
MODBUS Response [40]. Information exchange is used to read and write data access and 
for diagnostics purposes. MODBUS messaging consists of a MODBUS Application 
Protocol header (MBAP header) and a protocol data unit (PDU) consisting of a function 




S7comm is a Siemens proprietary protocol used for data exchange between PLCs 
and PLC programming. It is used to enable supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems to access PLC data [41]. It uses the Connection-Oriented Transport 
Protocol (COTP), the International Standards Organization ISO-on-TCP transport services, 
and TCP port 102. Message types include 0x01-Job Request, 0x02-Ack, 0x03-Ack-Data, 
and 0x07-Userdata [42]. A basic model for S7comm is shown in Table 1. 




The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) uses the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) on port 161 and allows network administrators to remotely manage, 
monitor, and configure network devices [43]. SNMP uses an SNMP Manager on the 
controller, an SNMP Agent on the device, and a ‘management information base’ [44]. 
Central management consoles for industrial control systems use SNMP to manage and 
maintain a network of PLCs [3]. 
5. IEC 61850 
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) and Generic Object Oriented 
Substation Event (GOOSE) protocols are nested under IEC 61850. MMS is similar to the 
proprietary S7Comm protocol in that it uses TCP port 102 for SCADA monitoring and 
 OSI layer  Protocol
7  Application Layer  S7 communication
6  Presentation Layer  S7 communication
5  Session Layer  S7 communication
4  Transport Layer  ISO-on-TCP (COTP)
3  Network Layer  IP
2  Data Link Layer  Ethernet
1  Physical Layer  Ethernet
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supports client/server communications [45]. GOOSE is used for sending command 
requests and status updates between IEDs and controllers using Ethernet-based multicast 
communications [45]. 
D. PREVIOUS GRIDPOT AND CONPOT WORK 
A 2015 Florida State University study about vulnerabilities of cyber-physical 
systems created GridPot as a proof of concept for physics-based intrusion detection, threat 
intelligence collection, and as an additional capability for CPS real-time situational 
awareness [46]. This experiment integrated a modified GridLAB-D with simulated 
substations, a SCADA operator interface, and IEDs using IEC 61850 protocols. A 
switching attack against IEC 61850 protocols was replicated during this experiment to 
illustrate the real-time physics analysis performed by GridPot. Our research differs in that 
it is focused more on network-based threat characterization rather than physics-based 
impact provided by a modified GridPot. 
The effectiveness of Conpot was analyzed in another project [47]. This experiment 
ran multiple virtualized Conpot instances using both the default template and a template 
simulating a gas-tank level, which were deployed globally using Amazon Web Services 
for an 18-day period. Conpot instances that were dependent on obsolete repositories had to 
be manually added. Analysis was conducted on scans using multiple Nmap flag settings in 
addition to results of Shodan scans. They concluded that Conpot accurately simulated 
SCADA ports but could be identified as a honeypot based on other open ports that appear 
when the system is scanned. 
Work at NPS conducted a study to generate cyberattack data specific to industrial 
control systems using Conpot version 0.5.1 [48]. The objective was to better understand 
indications of compromise on industrial control systems. This honeypot was deployed 
outside of the Naval Postgraduate School’s firewall from October 2017 to February 2018. 
It used Conpot’s default template to monitor the protocols HTTP, EtherNet/IP, MODBUS, 
S7Comm, SNMP, BACnet, and IPMI. This honeypot averaged 10.51 attacks per day from 
54 countries with a decrease in traffic over time, as shown in Figure 9. This research 
showed that Conpot is a viable platform for honeypot research for industrial control 
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systems, and suggested that the logs provided by Conpot need to be supplemented with a 
packet capture tool like Wireshark to extract more information about attacks. 
 
Figure 9.  NPS Conpot Data. Source: [48]. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. HOST ENVIRONMENT 
Our experiment used two environments, a test environment and a live environment. 
The test environment was used for the initial code review and baseline data collection. It 
also enabled internal testing and host-to-virtual-machine testing to establish baseline data 
for analysis and comparison. The live environment enabled external user access and threat 
data collection from outside of the campus firewall. 
Our live environment was a Dell XPS 8910 desktop computer running a Windows 
10 Home OS with 16 GM RAM and a 925 GM hard disk. We used Oracle VM Virtualbox 
5.2.22 to import and open our GridPot VM from the test environment. Our test environment 
was a Dell Precision M6800 laptop computer running a Linux x86-64 Ubuntu 18.04.01 
LTS operating system with 16 GB RAM and a 750 GB hard disk. We used Oracle VM 
Virtualbox 5.2.22 to install a virtual machine in which GridPot was installed. It ran the 
same operating system as the host and was configured with 10.7 GB of RAM and a 300 
GB virtualized hard disk. We used Network Address Translation (NAT), Host-Only-
Adapter, and Bridged-Adapter network settings in our live and test environments. The 
design and layout of our live setup is depicted in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Live Environment Setup. Adapted from [48]. 
B. GRIDPOT 
Our GridPot had a honeypot layer and a modeling layer as discussed in Chapter III. 
The honeypot layer initialized Conpot using the GridPot template and the modeling layer 
initialized a GridLAB-D model named IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses. Our GridPot 
installation steps are provided in Appendix A. 
1. Honeypot Layer 
Our Conpot was launched using a modified GridPot template. An example output 
of a successful launch is shown in Figure 11. We updated the ‘gridpotmodel_file’ field 
value to link with our modified GPM file named IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses shown in 
Appendix C. Four protocol servers were started upon launch as written in the original 
source code and are depicted in Table 2.   MODBUS is used on TCP/IP port 502 connecting 
to one MODBUS client and two MODBUS servers. Details of how we started Conpot 
using the GridPot template can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 11.  Launching Conpot Using the GridPot Template 
Table 2.   Protocol Servers Used by Conpot’s GridPot Template 
 
 
2. Modeling Layer 
We used the IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses model, which simulates an IEEE 8500 
distribution model with 13 nodes and 15 houses. A partial diagram of this distribution 
model is shown in Figure 12. We chose this model since it contained switch, transformer, 
and regulator objects used for the Conpot integration and required minimal code 
modifications. A schedule was used to alter power flow readings across the switch. Real-
time power-in and power-out simulated switch parameter values, which were displayed on 
our web-based interface. We created a GPM file to link with the switch, transformer, and 
regulator objects specified in the IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses GLM file by modifying 
an existing GPM file to ensure proper formatting. These modifications are shown in 
Appendix C. Chapter III explained how the honeypot layer and modeling layer were linked 








The switch is located between nodes 671 and 692. The transformer is located between 
nodes 633 and 634. The regulator is located between nodes 630 and 650.  
Figure 12.  Partial Layout of our IEEE 13 Node Grid Model. 
Source: [46]. 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
We collected data in three phases; an internal testing phase from within the virtual 
machine, a host-to-virtual-machine phase, and a live data collection phase. The internal 
phase tested GridPot’s source code and how Conpot and GridLAB-D interacted. The host-
to-virtual-machine phase established a baseline data repository to compare with live data 
results. The live data collection phase was the period in which the honeypot was connected 
to the Internet. 
We used the tools Wireshark, Nmap, Nessus, Metasploit, and Netstat. Wireshark, a 
network-protocol analyzer, captured packets on the network [49]. Nmap probed a target 
system to determine port status, active services, operating system, and MODBUS 
identification and device information [50]. Nessus, a vulnerability-assessment tool, 
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scanned for operational-technology devices and SCADA protocols active on the network 
[51]. Metasploit, a penetration-testing framework, detected MODBUS, found MODBUS 
units, and read MODBUS client data [52]. Netstat, a command line tool, printed 
networking subsystem information and showed listening and non-listening network 
sockets [53]. 
1. Internal Testing 
We conducted internal tests of our GridPot installation using a variety of tools. We 
altered the Conpot code to use its localhost IP address instead of retrieving the host 
environment’s external IP address upon start. This enabled our honeypot to keep all 
network traffic internal to our machine. First, we tested if our web-based interface display 
was accurate to the running model by pointing a web-browser to GridPot’s HTTP server 
using localhost IP address and TCP port 80 and comparing the results to the GridLAB-D 
model instance that listened on port 6267. We then used the Netstat tool to determine which 
ports were opened by GridPot. We tested this by executing ‘netstat –ano’ from the 
command line before and after starting GridPot. We then ran scans using Nmap, Nessus, 
and Metasploit against our honeypot. We focused these scans on open ports and probed for 
operational-technology devices using the MODBUS protocol by running MODBUS 
detection, MODBUS discovery, and MODBUS interaction scans. We focused on 
MODBUS since it is the most commonly known industrial-control-system protocol. 
Details of our internal testing are in Appendix D. 
2. Host-To-Virtual-Machine Baseline 
Host-to-virtual-machine baseline testing also used Nmap, Nessus, and Metasploit. 
Before starting this phase, we altered our network connectivity from disabled-network 
status to host-only status. This allowed for connectivity between our host machine and our 
GridPot virtual machine without allowing the GridPot virtual machine to connect to the 
Internet. To prevent GridPot from being viewable from outside our host machine, we left 
the previous change to the Conpot startup using its localhost address. 
We tested the host-only network status using ping commands between our host and 
our GridPot virtual machine and confirmed receipt of a ‘network is unreachable’ error 
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when trying to ping an arbitrary IP address. The same scans using Nmap, Nessus, and 
Metasploit were then performed with the target IP address set to the IP address of our GridPot 
virtual machine instead of the localhost IP address. To increase our log data for comparison 
against potential live denial-of-service (DOS) attacks, we conducted an additional scan using 
an auxiliary DOS Metasploit module during this baseline testing phase. Details are found in 
Appendix E. 
3. Live Data Collection 
We modified portions of the Conpot configuration that are common across Conpot 
instances to attract more interaction from would-be attackers. It was our desire that 
removing the simple indicators may prolong the attacker's identification of our system as 
a honeypot. The longer we can keep an attacker interacting with GridPot, the more data we 
have to determine what their intentions may be. Live data collection altered the static 
default configurations that could be used to fingerprint an instance of Conpot. These 
changes were accomplished by modifying the GridPot template XML file found in the 
Conpot subdirectory. We assumed by altering these default values we would increase our 
honeypot’s deception to both attackers and web crawlers. We used Shodan to determine 
the success of our deception efforts to suggest our honeypot was an actual energy 
distribution system [54]. To do this, we surveyed our IP address using Shodan’s 
Honeyscore website [26]. 
Our honeypot collected data over 19-days from April 11-30, 2019. GridPot ran 
continuously during this time period except when we brought down the honeypot layer on 
April 12 due to a broken link between our honeypot and our modeling layer. We fixed this 
issue and re-launched Conpot using the GridPot template, using the same procedure shown 
in Appendix B. We used Wireshark to complement the Conpot log to obtain more details 
about external source interactions with our honeypot. Wireshark packet capture (Pcap) files 
were saved every three hours. The Pcap files and honeypot logs were backed up to the host 
machine and stored on a NPS web-based shared platform twice a day on weekdays and 
once a day on weekends. GridPot was not affected by this back-up procedure and Pcap 
files older than two days were deleted from the live environment to free disk space. 
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D. PARSER DESIGN 
Wireshark has many built-in capabilities to analyze and report information from a 
packet capture (Pcap) file. However, these capabilities are limited to single Pcap file. To 
analyze sets of files, we wrote a Python program that uses the DPKT Python package [55] 
to examine the packets to determine the source IP address of traffic, the unique ports with 
which each address is attempting to connect, and the time period in which each IP address 
is actively sending packets to the honeypot. This data indicates actors that persisted and 
were searching for vulnerabilities, as well as actors conducting port scans. Results of our 
analysis tool were compared to the Conpot logs which provide source information as well 
as the payload of each packet. However, these logs do not provide enough information 
without an additional layer of analysis to monitor trends over time. We left this additional 
capability as future work. The Conpot log is sufficient, however, to provide an indication 
that an actor is active on a network without authorization. 
We used Microsoft Excel to filter the Conpot log by protocol. We then were able 
to count specific protocol instances to include the number of HTTP, MODBUS, and 
S7Comm sessions, HTTP requests and responses, HTTP versions, HTTP methods, 
MODBUS connections, MODBUS function codes, S7Comm connections, COTP 
connection requests, and S7 packets and PDU Types. We also used comparison functions 
to count repeat attacks, and graphing functions to show HTTP requests by source IP 
address, MODBUS connections and traffic by source IP address, S7Comm connections by 
source IP address, HTTP request method distribution, country interaction counts using 
HTTP, MODBUS, and S7Comm, and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of obvious 
scanning attacks using HTTP. 
E. UNEXPECTED COMPLICATIONS 
The GridPot source code pulled from GitHub was last updated in March 2015. 
There were many updates to Conpot and GridLAB-D since then, including GRIDLAB-D 
upgrading to Python 3.6. This caused many broken connections between the honeypot and 
the modeling layers which resulted in additional dependencies needing installation before 
we could successfully run our GridPot. We used the latest release of Ubuntu which 
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probably contributed to some of the additional older dependencies needing installation. A 
list of the additional dependencies we installed are listed in Appendix A. 
The GridPot source code also did not include all of the code needed to run the IEDs 
found in the electric-components subdirectory or reference what open-source tool was used 
to integrate a functioning SCADA operator interface. In-depth code review leads us to 
believe IEC 61850 communications would occur by launching the IEDs. We assume there 
is additional software needed to implement both the IEDs and SCADA operator interface 
and suggest they be implemented in future work. 
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V. DATA AND RESULTS 
Results of our internal and host-to-virtual-machine testing eventually proved 
successful. It confirmed our web-based interface accurately displayed values of the running 
GridLAB-D model. Netstat results confirmed that the four protocol ports shown in Table 
2 were open. Results of the Nmap, Nessus and Metasploit scans also saw these ports as 
open and saw that MODBUS-enabled devices were running on our honeypot. We 
confirmed that results received from internal testing were seen again during host-to-virtual-
machine testing. 
The honeypot first went online on April 11, 2019. The data collected by Wireshark 
as of April 29 totaled 9,240,989 packets. The bulk of this data was the result of network 
broadcast messages, address resolution protocol messages, and standard administrative 
traffic from the host machine, such as software updates. Filtering this data for network 
traffic to and from our honeypot reduced the data to 1,525,059 packets and 165 MBs. The 
traffic flow averaged 1.1 packets per second, and the average packet size was 108 bytes for 
113 bytes per second. The greatest number of packets to the honeypot came from an IP 
address to a California-based cloud-hosting corporation which accounted for 1,013,726 
packets and 63 MB of data. The second-highest source of packets was an IP address 
registered to an LLC in St. Petersburg, Russia, which was responsible for 56,280 packets 
and 3,221KB. Censys.io traced this address to a Debian-based SSH server in Amsterdam. 
This address sent 45,657 packets to GridPot over 12 days of which 38,754 were SYN 
packets sent to GridPot; also RST packets were sent to ports 5160, 5164, 5110, 5093, 5094, 
5112, 5134, and 5156. 
A. PROTOCOL DATA AND RESULTS 
1. Overall Statistics 
Our Conpot log recorded 9,641 HTTP requests, 621 MODBUS connections, 606 
MODBUS traffic instances, and 102 S7Comm connections from April 11-30, 2019. HTTP 
was the most commonly used protocol during this 19-day period with heavy scanning 
almost every day. Heavy scanning using MODBUS was seen twice. Thirty-nine unique 
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source addresses sent packets to our honeypot multiple times, with return visits either 
repeating the initial interaction or showing more HTTP requests which could be attributed 
to further reconnaissance efforts using learned information from the initial contact. Overall 
honeypot activity by protocol from April 11-30, 2019, is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Protocol Count by Source IP Address from April 11-30, 2019 
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The source addresses observed are shown in Figure 14. This was determined using 
the GeoLite2 plugin for Wireshark, developed by MaxMind [56]. The countries with more 
than 100 unique source addresses that probed our GridPot are depicted in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 14.  Source IP Address Endpoints 
 
Figure 15.  Countries Using More Than 100 Unique IP Source Addresses 
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The greatest number of packets came from an address registered to Fastly, a content 
delivery network provider. GridPot exchanged 84,588 packets with just one Fastly address 
which MaxMind attributes to a location in Seattle. Traffic from this address covered the 
entire duration of our collection. The traffic can be distinguished by its volume and 
persistence on our honeypot, but it contained over 26,000 retransmissions of nearly 
identical ACK messages. 
2. HTTP 
Our Conpot log recorded 453 new HTTP sessions, 9,641 HTTP requests, and 9,591 
HTTP responses in April 11-30, 2019. Of the 19,232 combined HTTP requests and 
responses, 18,886 were HTTP v1.1, 160 were HTTP v0.9, 108 were HTTP v1.0, and 78 
were either bad requests or had no HTTP version listed. Seven different HTTP methods 
were seen in the 9,641 HTTP requests (Figure 16), including 79 requests that did not use 
any methods and 78 invalid requests, shown as ‘None’ and ‘Bad’, respectively. 
 
Figure 16.  HTTP Request Method Distribution 
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Sixty-seven different countries interacted with our honeypot using HTTP during 
April 11-30, 2019. The top three were Brazil, the United States, and China. Eleven 
countries interacted with our honeypot at least 10 times, and 42 of the countries only 
interacted with our honeypot three times or less (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17.  HTTP Country Count from April 11-30, 2019 
Significant spikes in the number of HTTP requests were seen almost daily as shown 
in Figure 18.  Each peak contained roughly the same number of GET and POST request 
methods in the same order with varying speeds. This led us to believe these attackers used 
the same HTTP scanning tool to conduct the attacks. Fourteen attacks were using IP 
addresses associated with China, two with Hong Kong, and one with Mexico. 
We compared this apparent scanning to our host-to-virtual-machine logs and 
determined that the real scans did not match any of our test scans. We assess these scans 
are likely all using the same scanning tool. The real scans presented a strong correlation in 
the quantity and order of GET and POST request methods sent. This trend was not seen in 
any of our test scan results. To show the real scan correlation, we plotted CDFs of these 
attacks using distributions of HTTP GET shown in Figure 19, HTTP Post shown in Figure 
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20, and the combination of HTTP GET and HTTP POST shown in Figure 21. The x-axis 
for each of these figures is calculated using the start and end time of the attacks; the y-axis 
shows the distributions of the protocol method. 
 
Figure 18.  HTTP Requests from April 11-30, 2019 
 
Figure 19.  CDF of Attacks Using HTTP GET 
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Figure 20.  CDF of Attacks Using HTTP POST 
 
Figure 21.  CDF of Attacks Using HTTP 
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3. MODBUS 
Our Conpot log recorded 621 MODBUS connections and 606 MODBUS log 
entries during April 11-30, 2019. The majority of the MODBUS traffic, 597 entries, did 
not use a function code and the remainder of the traffic count was split between function 
codes 17 and 43, totaling 5 and 2, respectively. MODBUS connections and traffic over 
time are shown in Figure 22, highlighting outliers we investigated further. 
 
Figure 22.  MODBUS Connections and MODBUS Traffic from April 11-30, 
2019 
Protocol scanning using MODBUS was apparent in a manual review of the Conpot 
log, and was indicated by incrementing slave ID numbers with each new request seen with 
both April 17 and April 25. We compared the observed scanning to our host-to-virtual-
machine logs and inferred that Nmap and the ‘modbus-discover.nse’ script were used in 
both cases. The similarity in the sequencing of function code, slave ID, request values, and 
response values can be seen in the log of our Nmap scan shown in Figure 23 compared to 
the logs of attack scanning shown in Figures 24 and 25. 
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Figure 23.  Conpot Log from Host-to-Virtual-Machine Nmap Scan Using 
MODBUS Script 
 
Figure 24.  First Conpot Log of Likely Nmap Scan Using MODBUS Script 
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Figure 25.  Second Conpot Log of Likely Nmap Scan Using MODBUS Script 
MODBUS traffic originated from eight different countries, with the United States 
and Romania being the top two. The MODBUS traffic breakdown by country is shown in 
Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26.  MODBUS Traffic Distribution by Country 
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4. S7Comm 
During April 11-30, our Conpot log showed 20 new S7Comm sessions, 102 
S7Comm connections, 13 COTP connection requests, and 19 S7 packets. Messages of 
type-1 and type-7 were the only ones seen, of counts 6 and 13, respectively. S7Comm 
connections over time are shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27.  S7Comm Connections from April 11-30, 2019 
Eleven different countries connected to our honeypot using S7Comm; Japan 
connecting the most totaling 49 times, followed by the United Kingdom and the United 




Figure 28.  S7Comm Connections by Country 
B. DECEPTION RESULTS 
We used Shodan's ‘Honeypot Or Not’ tool to determine the convincingness of our 
GridPot implementation. This tool calculates the probability (ranging from 0.0 to 1.0) that 
an IP address is a honeypot [26]. Our IP address returned a score of 1.0, indicating with a 
strong probability that it is a honeypot. Even though our GridPot was not deceptive enough 
to fool Shodan, this did not prevent attackers from interacting with our honeypot. Either 
would be attackers were not aware that Shodan had classified our IP address as being 
attached to a honeypot or they chose to interact with it anyway. 
C. BENEFITS OF MULTI-TOOL LOGGING 
We used both Conpot log data and Wireshark Pcap files to analyze the data captured 
by our GridPot. The Conpot log captured high-level interaction data including timestamps, 
source IP addresses and ports, protocols used, and basic protocol information, and it tagged 
each interaction with a unique descriptor for source-flow analysis. Wireshark measured 
traffic patterns and also provided more detailed information for anomalies highlighted with 
the Conpot log. Wireshark tools provided several useful scripts for conducting analysis. 
The Conpot log was specific only to our monitored protocols. 
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Additional knowledge of other attack vectors, like a high number of packets sent to 
destination port 443, could prove useful for future work. Abnormally large traffic periods 
were easily found by saving Wireshark Pcaps every three hours. Pcap file sizes 10 times 
greater than the others stood out for immediate analysis. Hard drive and virtual-memory 
size constraints were not an issue during our research, but could become a problem the 
longer the honeypot remained active due to multi-tool logging using Wireshark. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Much time was spent reconfiguring GridPot to ensure our honeypot and modeling 
layers were working and integrating properly. This left only a 19-day period for live data 
collection. Our GridPot implementation proved successful at collecting intelligence for 
threat analysis during this period. It is apparent that attackers will exploit any web-based 
vulnerabilities in a SCADA external interface to gain access to the system, as seen in the 
large amount of HTTP traffic captured by our honeypot. This highlights the need to have 
SCADA administrators and operators trained on information security to ensure 
unauthorized web-based access attempts are stopped. Our GridPot also captured MODBUS 
scanning, indicating our simulated grid was realistic enough to encourage specialized-
protocol reconnaissance even though it was fingerprinted as a honeypot by Shodan. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
There are many different paths for follow-on work using GridPot. As mentioned, 
GridPot runs on comparatively old versions of Conpot and GridLAB-D. We recommend 
updating GridPot using the newest versions of Conpot and GridLAB-D. Rebuilding efforts 
would need to include the GridPot layer links shown in Figure 7 as well as the additional 
GridPot Python scripts in the original source code under the Conpot protocol subdirectory. 
Adding a SCADA operator interface is desirable since most attacks were using 
HTTP. This would add an additional layer of deception, which could increase the length of 
time attacks would interact with the honeypot. Presenting a SCADA operator interface 
would also make a more attractive target as it would be more believable than the read-only 
web page which GridPot currently uses. 
We recommend integrating IED device simulations to learn more about attacks 
using IEC 61850 communications. This could be simulated similar to the original GridPot 
source code under electric-components subdirectory, or by connecting a real physical 
device which could provide real-time visual feedback. 
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Future work could also increase deception within GridPot or increase interaction 
through use of honeynets. Deception could be added in the Internet registry or DNS 
information as a better way to hide the honeypot’s location. Attackers can easily fingerprint 
our honeypot currently by searching a WhoIs registry to determine ownership and note the 
tie to NPS. Using honeynets, multiple connected honeypots, could increase the number of 
attacks by presenting more interfaces with which to interact, although it would be harder 
to set up and maintain a honeynet. 
A final suggestion is to use a low-maintenance and easily deployable honeypot like 
T-Pot, an open-source multi-honeypot platform that can be configured to run dockerized 
versions of well-established honeypots including Conpot [57]. 
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APPENDIX A. GRIDPOT SETUP 
This appendix summarizes the steps required to install GridPot. We changed our 
virtual-machine network setting to use NAT during this setup. 
1. Installing dependencies (from the command line) 
$ sudo apt-get update 
$ sudo apt-get upgrade 
$ sudo apt-get install autoconf (this includes automake) 
$ sudo apt-get install libtool subversion python-dev mysql-server 
$ sudo apt-get install libmysqlclient-dev libmysqld-dev 
$ sudo apt-get install libxerces-c-dev python-mysqldb python-pip 
$ sudo apt-get install libcurl3 libcurl4-openssl-dev libcurl4-
gnutls-dev 
$ pip install –U sphinx 
$ sudo apt-get install python3-sphinx libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev 
$ sudo pip install lxml gevent python-dateutil mixbox 
$ sudo pip install pyasn1 pycryptodomex pysmi 
$ sudo apt-get install doxygen 
$ sudo apt-get install libcppunit-dev libcppunit-doc 
$ sudo apt-get install libncurses5-dev libncursesw5-dev 
2. Pulling GridPot from GitHub 
$ sudo apt install git 
$ git clone [36] 
3. Setup Conpot 
$ cd gridpot/conpot/ 
$ conpot/ sudo make clean (if rebuilding) 
$ conpot/ sudo python setup.py install 
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4. Setup GridLAB-D 
$ cd ../gridlabd/3.1 
$ autoreconf -isf 
$ make 
$ sudo make install 
5. Setup libiec61850 
$ cd ../libiec61850 
$ make 
$ sudo make INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local install 
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APPENDIX B. RUNNING GRIDPOT 
This appendix summarizes the steps required to clear and enable logging from both 
the honeypot and modeling layers, enable packet captures, and run GridPot. 
0. Save & clear Conpot log 
$ cat conpot.log >> conpot_original.log 
$ vim conpot.log 
:0 (to go to beginning of file) 
dG (to erase file) 
shift+zz (to save & exit) 
1. Start Wireshark 
$ sudo wireshark 
2. Start GridLAB-D model with output to screen and file 
$ gridlabd -D run_realtime=1 --server --debug --verbose 
IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses.glm 2>&1 | tee HousesOutput.txt 
3. Start Conpot using GridPot template 
$ sudo conpot -t gridpot –v 
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APPENDIX C. MODIFIED GPM FILE 
This appendix summarizes the modifications made to the GPM file. GPM format 
is a configuration file written using Python’s ConfigParser module. This module contains 
sections beginning with [section] headers, trailed by ‘name: value’ entries, and ignores 
comment lines beginning with a ‘#’ symbol [58]. 
IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses.gpm 
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APPENDIX D. INTERNAL TESTING  
This appendix summarizes the steps we completed for internal testing using our 
interface, the NETSTAT command, and running Nmap, Nessus, and Metasploit scans of 
our network. We disabled our virtual-machine network settings during this internal testing 
phase. 
1.  Web-based Interface  
Run GridPot (see Appendix B.) 
Open web-browser to localhost:80 
Open web-browser to localhost:6267/650630/status 
Open web-browser to localhost:6267/tp_line_conductor/resistance 
Stop GridPot (ctrl+c) 
Pull Logs (Wireshark, Conpot, HousesOutput) 
2.  Netstat 
$ netstat -ano >gridpot/conpot/Print/netstat_beforeStart.txt 
Run GridPot (see Appendix B.) 
$ netstat -ano >gridpot/conpot/Print/netstat_afterStart.txt 
Pull Logs (Wireshark, Conpot, HousesOutput, Netstat output files)  
3.  NMAP Scans 
Run GridPot (see Appendix B.) 
$ sudo nmap -p- -oN nmap_port.txt localhost 
$ sudo nmap -v -sV -O -oN nmap_v-sV-O.txt localhost 
$ sudo nmap --script modbus-discover.nse --script-args='modbus-
discover.aggressive=true' -p 502 -oN nmap_modbus.txt localhost 
Stop GridPot (ctrl+c) 
Pull Logs (Wireshark, Conpot, HousesOutput, nmap output files) 
  
 52 
4.  Nessus Scans 
$ /etc/init.d/nessusd start 
Open web-browser to https://localhost:8834 
Run GridPot (see Appendix B.) 
Run Nessus Advanced Dynamic Scan: set 127.0.0.1 as the target, 
select ‘scan operational technology devices’ (found under Host Discovery) 
and match plugin description contains SCADA 
Run Nessus Advanced Scan: set 127.0.0.1 as the target, select ‘scan 
operational technology devices’ (found under Host Discovery) and enable 
all plugins including SCADA family 
$ /etc/init.d/nessusd stop 
Stop GridPot (ctrl+c) 
Pull Logs (Wireshark, Conpot, HousesOutput, Nessus reports) 
5.  Metasploit Scans 
Run GridPot (see Appendix B.) 
$ msfconsole 
$ use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbus_findunitid 
$ show options 
$ set RHOST 127.0.0.1 
$ run 
$ back 
$ use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusdetect 
$ show options 
$ set RHOST 127.0.0.1 
$ run 
$ back 
$ use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient 
$ show actions 
 53 
$ set ACTION READ_COILS (READ_REGISTERS) 
$ show options 
$ set RHOST 127.0.0.1, RPORT 502, UNIT_NUMBER 1, NUMBER 1 (10, 100) 




Stop GridPot (ctrl+c) 
Pull Logs (Wireshark, Conpot, HousesOutput, msf output files) 
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APPENDIX E. HOST-TO-VIRTUAL MACHINE TESTING 
This appendix summarizes the steps we completed for host-to-virtual-machine 
scanning using Nmap, Nessus, and Metasploit. We changed our virtual-machine network 
setting to use Host-Only Adapter during this testing phase. We testing our connectivity 
using the ping command to/from our host (X.X.X.1) and client (X.X.X.101) and confirmed 
receipt of a ‘network is unreachable’ error when trying to ping an arbitrary IP address. 
1.  NMAP scans 
See Appendix D.3., change localhost to X.X.X.101 
2.  Nessus Scans 
See Appendix D.4., change target from 127.0.0.1 to X.X.X.101 
3.  Metasploit Scans 
See Appendix D.5., change RHOST from 127.0.0.1 to X.X.X.101 and run 
all scans, including additional scan and dos attack listed below before 
exiting. 
$ use auxiliary/scanner/scada/profinet_siemens 
$ show actions 
$ show options 
$ set INTERFACE enp0s3 
$ run 
$ back 
$ use auxiliary/dos/scada/siemens_siprotec4 
$ show options 
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